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Abstract 
We experimentally investigated how different mnemonic techniques employed in an 
interview conducted immediately after an event affected truth tellers’ and liars’ responses 
when they were interviewed again after a two-week delay. We also compared how verbal 
accounts changed over time within truth tellers and liars, and how consistent both groups 
were. Participants (n = 143) were shown a mock intelligence operation video and instructed 
either to tell the truth or lie about its contents in two interviews, one of which was 
immediately after watching the video and the other after a two-weeks delay. In the immediate 
interview they were asked to provide a free recall and then asked to provide further 
information via one of three mnemonics: Context Reinstatement, Sketch, or Event-line. In the 
delayed interview they were asked to provide only a free recall. Truth tellers reported more 
visual, spatial, temporal and action details than liars both immediately and after a delay. Truth 
tellers experienced more of a decline in reporting details after a delay than liars, and this 
decline was affected by the mnemonic used. Truth-tellers thus showed, more than liars, 
patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay. Liars produced patterns of a 
‘stability bias’ instead. Truth tellers and liars were equally consistent between their immediate 
and delayed statements. 
 Keywords: Verbal lie detection, mnemonics, Reality Monitoring, richness of detail, 
consistency, repeated interviews, delay, memory. 
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Facilitating memory-based lie detection in immediate and delayed interviewing: The 
role of mnemonics 
 In deception research, truth tellers and liars are typically interviewed once, 
immediately after the event (Vrij, 2008, 2016), and truth tellers’ statements typically include 
more detail than liars’ statements (Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vrij, 2008). However, in real life investigative situations, it is very common for 
interviewees to be interviewed several times about the same target event and after different 
delay periods (days, weeks, or months; Goldsmith, Koriat, & Pansky, 2005; Read & Conolly, 
2007; Wysman, Scoboria, Gawrylowicz, & Memon, 2014). In the current experiment, truth 
tellers and liars were interviewed about a mock incident twice: Immediately after the incident 
and two weeks later.   
Although the difference between truth tellers and liars in terms of the amount of 
reported details is evident when they are interviewed immediately after an event (Vrij, 2005, 
2008, 2015), in those few studies where participants were interviewed at different points in 
time, this difference tended to decline when interviews were conducted after a delay, making 
the credibility cue ‘richness of detail’ less diagnostic over time (Harvey, Vrij, Hope, Leal, & 
Mann, 2017; McDougall & Bull, 2014; Vrij et al., 2009). This effect reflects different 
response patterns amongst truth tellers and liars. Truth tellers show ‘the forgetting curve’ 
(Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913) of memory: People forget information over time when there is no 
active attempt to retain it (Evans & Fisher, 2011; Lawson & London, 2015; Turtle & Yuille, 
1994). The passage of time weakens memory traces, thereby reducing access to the original 
information (Goldsmith et al., 2005; Penrod, Loftus, & Winkler, 1982; Schacter, 1999). In 
addition, studies examining witness’ episodic memory showed a reduction in recall of details 
in repeated retrieval attempts over time (Turtle & Yullie, 1994; Tuckey & Brewer, 2004). 
Liars, however, show a ‘stability bias’ (Harvey et al., 2017). This bias refers to a 
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metacognitive error to correctly understand the nature of memory decline over time (Kornell 
& Bjork, 2009). According to this concept, liars overestimate memory and fail to accurately 
calibrate their verbal output to take into account genuine memory decay. 
Deception researchers have started to address memory-related factors affecting the 
statements of both truth tellers and liars in repeated and delayed statements (McDougall & 
Bull, 2015; Vrij et al., 2009; Harvey et al., 2017). In interviewing contexts, memory-related 
issues are important for two reasons: First, complete and accurate statements provided by 
cooperative witnesses or suspects are one of the main goals of investigative interviews 
(Geiselman et al., 1984; Kebbel & Milne, 1998; Pansky & Nemets, 2012). Memory retrieval 
for original information becomes more difficult over time, which can result in less complete 
statements. A decrease in forensically relevant reported information may negatively affect a 
criminal investigation. Second, a vaguer content can raise doubts about someone’s credibility. 
Previous studies with police officers have shown that the amount of information provided is 
an important cue for them to decide whether or not an interviewee is credible (Akehurst, 
Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003).     
One factor that could facilitate retrieval of information even after long retention 
intervals is the use of memory-enhancing techniques (or ‘mnemonics’) (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). Using mnemonics is valuable in real life because truthful interviewees can provide a 
lot of details valuable for criminal investigations, including descriptions of people, times of 
the criminal activities, locations of various crime related objects, etc. It is also important to 
understand whether deceptive interviewees tend to respond differently to mnemonics after 
different retention intervals. We examined how different mnemonics affected immediate 
reports by truth tellers and liars and how these mnemonics affected their responses when they 
were interviewed again after a two-week delay.  
Mnemonics and deception 
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Memory enhancing interview techniques take into account two basic principles of 
human memory: a) A memory trace has several features and the effectiveness of a retrieval 
cue is dependent on the amount of overlap between the retrieval cue and the encoded event 
(Flexser & Tulving, 1978); and b) several retrieval paths to the encoded event may be 
available, so that information not accessible with one retrieval cue may be accessible with 
another (Tulving, 1974). Regarding the latter, a person may not report specifically where s/he 
placed an item in the room when asked a direct question, but may recall a concrete location 
when requested to draw a layout of that room. Mnemonics are typically included in evidence-
based investigative interviewing guidelines (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Clarke, Milne, & Bull, 
2011; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Research has shown the advantage of using mnemonics 
over standard interviewing techniques in terms of eliciting more complete statements, without 
the cost of an inflated amount of inaccurate information (Davis, McMahon & Greenwood, 
2005; Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Memon, Meissner & Fraser, 2010). 
Different types of mnemonic techniques have been adapted for use in investigative 
interviewing, three of which are introduced in this paper. Context reinstatement (CR) requires 
witnesses to mentally place themselves back in the experienced event (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). Studies have shown memory improvement in recalling details when using this 
mnemonic in both children and adults (Priestley, Roberts, & Pipe, 1999; Wong & Read, 
2011). Another technique, making a Sketch of the crime scene, has also resulted in a more 
complete account of an event compared to standard questioning procedures (Dando, Wilcock, 
Behnkle, & Milne, 2011; Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009). Finally, the Event-line mnemonic 
technique, is based on the Timeline interviewing format developed by Hope, Mullis, and 
Gabbert (2013), which is related to reproducing temporal context and sequence of actions in 
an event. The Timeline facilitated more correct information than a free recall both 
immediately after an event and after a two-week delay (Hope et al., 2013). In our study, we 
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positioned CR as a generic mnemonic which is known as an effective memory-enhancing 
technique (Dando et al., 2009; Emmett, Clifford, & Gwyer, 2003; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). 
We also sought to examine the effects of more specialised mnemonics (sketch and event-line) 
that target specific types of information (spatial or temporal) and contrast them with 
performance on a generic CR.   
Previous findings also suggest that the use of mnemonics can aid in discriminating 
between truthful and deceptive statements, because truth tellers benefit more from such 
memory enhancement techniques than liars. Liars may lack the imagination to report as many 
(plausible) details as truth tellers, or they may be unwilling to do so out of fear that these 
additional details give checkable leads to investigators (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). In one 
study, truth tellers and liars were interviewed with the Cognitive Interview (CI), which 
contains various mnemonics, or with a standard interview protocol which did not contain 
mnemonics (Hernández & Alonso-Quequty, 1997). It was found that truth tellers reported 
more spatial, temporal, and sensory details than liars, and the difference was largest when the 
CI was used. In another study, it was found that the CI was more efficient than a standard 
interview in discriminating between truth tellers and liars when examining actions and objects 
details (Bembibre & Higueras, 2011). When the sketch mnemonic was introduced, it was 
found that a sketch resulted in more pronounced differences between truth tellers and liars 
than a verbal recall (Vrij et al., 2009; Vrij et al., 2010). Thus, previous findings suggest that 
mnemonics can aid in eliciting more information about the event in question, but also in better 
discrimination between truthful and deceptive accounts than standard questions. 
Regarding real life interviewing settings, the application of mnemonics can be 
valuable because they do not require many resources (e.g., in contrast to polygraph machines), 
and are easy to implement and analyse (Vrij et al., 2010; Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Vernham, 
2017). Thus, these techniques can be useful for practitioners to make inferences about the 
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credibility of interviewees. As yet it is unknown how different mnemonics affect not only 
immediate, but also delayed statements reported by truth tellers and liars.     
Consistency as a cue to deceit 
 In real-life testimonies, consistency is regarded as an important cue for making 
credibility judgments (de Keijser, Malsch, Kranendonk, & de Gruijter, 2011; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2001; Granhag, Mac Giolla, Sooniste, Strömwall, & Liu-Johnson, 2016). Both 
laypeople and legal professionals tend to believe that consistency is indicative of truth-telling, 
whereas inconsistency is a sign of lying (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2000). Scientific evidence however has revealed an opposite pattern: 
Truth tellers can be equally or even less consistent in their statements than liars (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2002; Strömwall & Granhag, 2005; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). 
This pattern can be explained by the nature of memory functioning in truth tellers and 
strategies commonly used by liars to mimic credibility. Specifically, Granhag and Strömwall 
(1999) introduced the ‘repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis’ regarding the relationship between 
consistency and deception. This hypothesis is based on two premises: First, liars believe that 
being consistent is important in order to come across as being credible and they are therefore 
keen to repeat their original story when interviewed a second time. Second, truth tellers are 
less concerned with consistency than liars (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Hartwig, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). When interviewed a second time, truth tellers go 
back to their memory of the event and, due to the malleable nature of human memory 
(Baddeley, 1990; Loftus, 1979), may subsequently add, omit or change details as a function of 
a repeated retrieval attempt (Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig et al., 2010). Therefore, when truth 
tellers rely on their memory of an event, their statements are likely to contain various types of 
inconsistencies (Vredevelt et al., 2014). Consistency is related to repetition of the same 
details, whereas reminiscences (details reported in a subsequent account, but not mentioned 
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previously) and omissions (details reported previously but not in a subsequent account) are 
related to inconsistency (Vredevelt et al., 2014).    
There are four different types of consistency typically analysed in deception studies: a) 
consistency between details within one statement, within-statement consistency; b) 
consistency between different statements made by one person, between-statement consistency; 
c) consistency between statements reported by different individuals about the same event, 
within-group consistency; and d) consistency between the statement and evidence, statement-
evidence consistency (Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Given our design and aims of the study, we 
will cover only the between-statement consistency. In this study, we examined the effects of 
three mnemonics on truth tellers’ and liars’ immediate statements and repeated statements 
after a two-week delay: CR mnemonic, spatial mnemonic (using sketch), and temporal 
mnemonic (using event-line). In the immediate interview, truth tellers and liars were first 
invited in a free recall to report everything they could remember about the event. After the 
free recall, a mnemonic was introduced and the interviewees were again invited to report all 
they could remember. Truth tellers and liars were then interviewed again after a two-week 
delay (free recall phase only).  
Statement characteristics and hypotheses 
The analysis of statements from truth tellers and liars was based on the Reality 
Monitoring approach (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981). The main assumption of RM is that 
memories based on real experiences differ in quality from fictional ‘recollections’ (Masip, 
Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2015). Perceptual processes are involved in memories 
of real experiences (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Therefore, it is likely that they will contain, 
amongst other types of detail, sensory (smell, taste, touch, visual or audible details) and 
contextual (spatial and temporal details) information. In addition, real memories are usually 
clearer, sharper, and more vivid than imagined memories, which typically contain less detail 
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and are vaguer and less concrete (Vrij, 2015). The amount of different types of RM detail 
(visual, spatial, temporal, and action) between truthful and deceptive statements was 
compared. (In)consistency characteristics of truth tellers and liars (reminiscences, repetitions, 
and omissions; Granhag & Strömwall, 2002) typically identified in deception literature were 
also analysed.  
In this study, we were interested in the differences between the report content of truth 
tellers and liars in immediate and delayed interviews. As a result of retrieval practice in the 
CR condition, we expected that neither truth tellers nor liars would show a memory decline in 
reporting detail after a delay, and that truth tellers would report even more visual, spatial, 
temporal, and action details than liars after a delay in the CR condition (Hypothesis 1). In the 
Sketch condition it was predicted that truth tellers would report more visual and spatial details 
than liars after a delay as a result of practising these details in the sketch. We also expected 
that truth tellers, but not liars, would show a memory decline in temporal and action details 
after a delay, as these details would be less practiced in the sketch (Hypothesis 2). In the 
Event-line condition, it was predicted that truth tellers would report more temporal and action 
details than liars after a delay as a result of practising these details in the event-line. Truth 
tellers, but not liars, would show a memory decline in visual and spatial details after a delay, 
as these details would be less practiced in the event-line (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we were also 
interested in how consistent truth tellers and liars would be in immediate and delayed 
interviews. In line with the above reasoning, we predicted that truth tellers would produce 
more reminiscences and omissions than liars between immediate and delay interviews 
(Hypothesis 4). 
Our immediate interview included two parts, a free recall phase and a mnemonic 
phase, which we introduced due to its operational relevance. Specifically, in real life 
situations it is arguably more typical to start with a general open-ended request and then ask 
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for more specific information. Furthermore, the recent investigative interviewing guidelines 
suggest to use free recall first and follow with mnemonic techniques (Milne & Bull, 1999; 
Milne, Shaw, & Bull, 2007). In our analyses of the immediate and delayed reports, 
comparisons were made only between the free recall phases of the immediate and delayed 
interviews (the delayed interview only included a free recall phase). We did not take into 
account the information provided in the mnemonic phase of the immediate interview for two 
reasons: First, comparisons between immediate and delayed statements within conditions 
would be difficult in terms of the amount of details. In all experimental conditions, immediate 
statements would obviously be richer in detail because immediate interviews contain two 
phases whereas delayed statements only contain one. Second, different mnemonics could 
elicit different amounts of information due to their specifics. Therefore, it would also make 
comparisons of immediate and delayed reports complicated. 
Although we did not specifically formulate hypotheses related to participants’ 
performance during the mnemonic part of the immediate interview, we considered it 
important to report the outcomes of this phase of the interview, as it gives further insight into 
how truth tellers and liars respond to mnemonics.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 143 participants took part in the study. Their mean age was M = 25.57 (SD 
= 12.55) and 35.7% were male. In the sample, 80.4% were undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, and 18.6% were members of the general public. Participants were recruited via 
posters, flyers, online participant pool system, and online advertisements on the University’s 
staff portals. As the experiment focused on the verbal content of the statements, native 
English speakers were prioritised to take part. The majority of participants (93.7%) were 
English native speakers; the remaining participants were fluent in English. Participants were 
 Mnemonics and memory-based lie detection 12 
awarded two course credits or £10 for taking part in the study. In addition, all participants 
were entered into a draw to win a single prize worth £150 on completion of the experiment. 
The study was approved by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee of the University. 
Design 
A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs deceptive) X 3 (Mnemonic type: CR vs sketch vs event-
line) X 2 (Interview time: Immediate vs delayed) experimental design was used with Veracity 
and Mnemonic as between-subjects factors and Interview as within-subjects factor. 
Participants were randomly assigned as truth tellers (n = 70) and liars (n = 73). Truth tellers 
were randomly allocated to the CR (n = 24), sketch (n = 23), or event-line conditions (n = 
23). Similarly, liars were randomly assigned to one of the three mnemonic conditions (CR, n 
= 23; sketch, n = 26; and event-line, n = 24). All participants were interviewed on two 
occasions, immediately after the stimulus event and (approximately) two weeks later. Not all 
participants were available to be interviewed again after exactly 14 days and so the delay 
period for the second interview varied between 8 and 21 days (M = 14.10, SD = 1.46, Mode = 
14 (61.5% of cases). 
Materials 
Stimulus event. Participants were instructed to watch a video about a simulated 
break-in. They were instructed to imagine they were taking the role of an intelligence officer 
working undercover with another officer.  They were told their task was to break into an 
apartment and secure some important intelligence information. This ‘special task’ was 
recorded from the perspective of the person (e.g. participant) who followed the other ‘officer’ 
throughout the break-in. Participants were explicitly instructed that they were ‘following their 
colleague’ during the break-in.   
The video event (lasting five minutes) shows a man entering a basement floor from the 
outside of the building. He then walks about ten metres through a corridor and tries to break 
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into one of the doors at the end of the corridor. After a couple of attempts to open the door 
with a key, he walks into the room. The man in the video searches the room (desks, shelves, 
cupboards, clothes, etc.). He takes two mobile phones from a desk, jewellery (necklace and 
two rings) from a cupboard, a laptop from a dining table, and a driving licence, debit card, 35 
euros and 20 dollars in cash from a wallet in a jacket. He then leaves the room with these 
items. As the man walks back along the corridor on his way out, a neighbour opens a door, 
witnesses him leaving, and immediately closes the door. The man who broke in stops and 
briefly looks around by the building exit. Finally, he leaves. 
Mnemonics. Three different memory-enhancing techniques used in this study are 
explained below.  
CR . This mnemonic consisted of asking interviewees to mentally recreate the to-be-
recalled event, as well as their physiological, cognitive and emotional states at the time of the 
event (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). In our study we instructed participants to (mentally) go 
back to the very start of the break-in, take a few moments to picture in their mind where they 
were, who they were with and what they could see during the event including the descriptions 
of objects, locations, and the sequence of actions. Participants were asked to give themselves 
plenty of time to concentrate and visualise what happened during the break-in. Also, they 
were requested to shut their eyes while trying to remember the event.  
Sketch. Interviewees were asked to sketch the event and then use that drawing to 
describe what they had experienced. Sketching the crime scene allows witnesses to initiate 
their own contextual retrieval cues (Paulo, Albuquerque, & Bull, 2013)1. The participants 
made their drawing on an A3 sized blank sheet of paper. They were requested to use as much 
                                                          
1 It is important to clarify the use of the term ’Sketch’ in this paper. In the literature on the investigative 
interviewing this mnemonic is also known as ‘Sketch Reinstatement of Context’. However, in some sources the 
term ‘Sketch’ can also be found, e.g., Hope et al., 2011; Rivard et al., 2014. In the deception literature, the term 
‘Sketch’ (or ‘Drawing’) is more common (e.g., Hjelmsater et al., 2014; Mac Giolla et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2010). 
Therefore, we decided to use the latter.  
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space as they needed to sketch the apartment as they remembered it. Participants were 
instructed to include as many details as possible about where different objects were in relation 
to other objects. They could also use labels and notes within their sketch to indicate the 
features of the scene or to indicate if they were not certain of something. After making the 
sketch, participants were asked to describe in as much detail as possible what they had 
witnessed during the break-in.   
Event-line. In this study participants were instructed to write on an A3 sized sheet of 
paper with a graphical line (a grid divided into minutes) all actions from the event they could 
remember and to indicate on that line at what time these actions occurred. The grid was 
divided into six scale points (from 0 minutes to 5 minutes) because the actual break-in lasted 
5 minutes and 15 seconds. The grid was located on the top of the page allowing enough space 
for participants to write underneath it. Participants were asked to write in the empty space and 
then put arrows on the event-line indicating the time of the specific activities. After 
completing the event-line, participants were instructed to describe the event-line in as much 
detail as possible. 
Procedure 
Pre-interview phase. After watching the break-in, each participant was instructed 
either to tell the truth or to lie during the interview. Truth tellers and liars were given almost 
identical instructions. To minimise the risk of liars telling an embedded lie (for example by 
describing the apartment they genuinely lived in), all interviewees were told that the 
apartment they broke in to was a staff room of a community centre. Truth tellers were told 
that the break-in was successful and that they would be interviewed by a fellow agent to 
continue the intelligence investigation. They were asked to report truthfully during the 
interview 1) the interior of the staff room in the video, and 2) what they took from there. Liars 
where also told that the break-in was successful. However, they were told that they would be 
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interviewed by an agent from a hostile organisation and that their task was, therefore, to 
mislead that agent. They were told that if the hostile agent came to know where exactly they 
broke in and exactly what was taken from the apartment, the entire investigation would be in 
jeopardy. They were instructed to tell the hostile agent a cover story that they broke into a 
different staff room in a different community centre. Therefore, liars were instructed to lie 
about 1) the interior of the apartment in the video, and 2) what they took from there. To 
motivate all participants to do well in the interviews they were told that they would receive 
two course credits or £10, and would only be entered in the draw to win £150 value prize if 
they were convincing during the interview. They were further told that if the interviewer 
thought that they did not report everything they remembered, they would only receive one 
course credit or £5, would be excluded from the draw, and would be asked to write down a 
full account of what happened in the video.     
After the instructions to tell the truth or lie, participants were given unlimited time to 
prepare for the interview. They were given a blank sheet of paper and pen in case they needed 
to use whilst their preparation. However, they were not allowed to take any notes they made 
to the actual interview afterwards. When participants indicated that they had prepared 
themselves, they were given a pre-interview questionnaire in which both truth tellers and liars 
were requested to answer the questions truthfully. In the questionnaire participants were asked 
to rate on 7-point scales their preparation for the interview. They were asked to indicate how 
i) well they were prepared (1 = very poor, 7 = very good); and how ii) sufficient (1 = 
insufficient, 7 = sufficient); and iii) complete (1 = incomplete, 7 = complete) their preparation 
was. We clustered these three preparation items into one variable, Preparation quality, since 
Cronbach’s alpha  (.86) indicated high consistency. The pre-interview questionnaire also 
included questions on how iv) stressed (1 = not at all, 7 = very stressed); v) motivated (1 = 
not at all, 7 = totally), and vi) confident (1 = not at all, 7 = totally) the participants felt about 
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being convincing in the upcoming interview. This pre-interview questionnaire was 
administered twice, both before the immediate and delayed interviews.  Cronbach’s alpha for 
the preparation quality cluster was .86 for the delay interview.   
Interviews. Participants were questioned by an interviewer who was blind to the aims 
of the study, stimulus material, and veracity conditions. At the beginning of the immediate 
interview, participants in all experimental conditions were given the same free recall (FR) 
instruction. They were asked to report everything they could remember from the break-in, 
including descriptions of objects and locations, the sequences of actions, and information 
about any people that were involved.  After completion of this initial report, one of the three 
mnemonics (CR, sketch or event-line) was administered. Then participants were asked for a 
second report, i.e. to verbally reinstate the context, describe the sketch, or describe the event-
line. 
 After the immediate interview all participants were told that they would have to come 
back again in two weeks’ time. At the beginning of this delayed interview, the same 
procedure was used as in the immediate interview (instruction to tell the truth/lie, preparation, 
and pre-interview questionnaire). Participants were then asked to provide a free recall account 
about the break-in. 
Our aim was that the same interviewer would conduct both interviews to avoid the risk 
of an interviewer influencing an interviewee’s accounts. However, some participants were 
interviewed by different interviewers due to time management issues (e.g. availability of 
participants, research assistants or interviewers). The majority of participants (81.1%) were 
interviewed both times by the same interviewer and two interviewers conducted the majority 
of the interviews (72.0%). To test possible random interviewer effects, we compared total 
details of the delayed accounts between participants who were questioned by the same 
interviewer during both interviews with participants who were questioned by the 
 Mnemonics and memory-based lie detection 17 
different interviewer during the delayed interview. The difference was not significant, 
t(141) = 0.83, p = .408, d  = .19. 
To achieve that interviewees followed identical instructions during pre-interview 
and interview phases, scripts were prepared that were required to use in every interview 
by the research assistants and interviewers.     
Post-interview questionnaire. After the delayed interview, participants were asked to 
fill out a post-interview questionnaire. As with the pre-interview questionnaire, truth tellers 
and liars were requested to respond truthfully. The post-interview questionnaire included 
questions to assess (again, on 7-point Likert scales) what they thought the likelihood was of 
getting two credits or £10 and having to write a statement (1 = not at all, 7 = very likely). In 
addition, as previous research has shown that active repetition of learned information can 
buffer against memory decline, we asked participants in an open-ended question how many 
times they had tried to remember the break-in (truth tellers)/cover story (liars) in the time 
between the two interviews. Lastly, we asked participants to assess the extent to which they i) 
told the truth, and ii) lied during the interview. Answers were given on an 11-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0% (not at all) to 100% (totally). These two questions were asked twice to 
assess the truthfulness in both the immediate and delayed interviews. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were thanked and fully debriefed. All 
participants were paid £10 or given two credits for participation. After completing data 
collection, one participant was randomly selected as the £150 prize winner.   
Coding 
RM details. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. All statements were coded for the 
details provided by interviewees. Details were counted separately for responses to: 1) free 
recall (FR); 2) one of three mnemonics in the immediate interviews; and 3) FR in the delayed 
interviews. Each detail was counted once per question response. For example, if the word 
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‘table’ was mentioned twice during the FR in the immediate interview (and had the meaning 
of the same ‘table’), it was counted only once. However, if the same detail was mentioned in 
the different parts of the interview or different interviews, it was counted separately. Four 
types of detail were coded: i) visual details: specific items/description of items seen by the 
interviewee. For example, ‘He1 walked through a double2 brown3 door4’ contains four visual 
details; ii) spatial details: information about locations or spatial arrangements of people or 
objects. For example, ‘There were two doors on either side1 of the corridor and one door in 
front2, and I was walking behind my colleague 3’ contains three spatial details; iii) temporal 
details: reference to the sequence of activities, their duration, or information when something 
happened: ‘When1 we got there, it took us about a minute2 to open the door, then3 we quickly4 
searched the room’ contains four temporal details; and iv) action details: information about 
the actions carried out by people in the event: ‘He picked up1 a laptop, we then walked over2 
to the entrance door and left3 through that door’ contains three action details. This coding 
system is based on the Reality Monitoring approach (Johnson & Raye, 1981) and has been 
used frequently in previous deception research (Vrij, 2008).  
Two coders carried out the coding. Both coders were trained by a senior member in 
the research lab.  They received definitions and examples of the to-be-coded variables and 
were asked to code some practice statements. The trainer gave feedback on the coding and 
gave the coders a few more practice statements. The coders were given permission to start 
coding the interviews when the trainer was satisfied with their coding of the practice 
statements. 
The first coder, the first author of this study, marked all transcripts. The second coder, 
blind to the hypotheses, stimulus event, and veracity of the statements, marked a random 
sample of 29 interview scripts (20.28%) to measure reliability. Inter-rater reliabilities between 
the two coders for the frequency of detail in both (immediate and delayed) statements were 
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measured via interclass correlation coefficients (ICC). The ICC revealed excellent inter-rater 
values: .99, CI [.98,.99] for visual details; .98, CI [.88,.99] for spatial details; .92, CI [.82,.96]  
for temporal details; and .97, CI [.84,.98] for action details.  
Between-statement consistency. We measured consistency in the responses between 
the immediate FR and delayed FR. The RM details coded previously were used for 
consistency analysis. This time we did not split details into visual, spatial, temporal, and 
action details, but only examined the total amount of RM details. We made a distinction 
between repetitions (details reported in both immediate and delayed FR), reminiscences 
(details reported in the delayed FR but not in the immediate FR), and omissions (details 
reported in the immediate FR but not in the delayed FR). These measures are typically used in 
deception studies analysing consistencies, as contradictions (the fourth aspect of consistency) 
do not occur often enough in most experimental deception research to be used in the statistical 
analyses (e.g. Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2016; Deeb et al., 2017).   
The coders only marked reminiscences. Repetitions and omissions were obtained by 
using arithmetic calculations. We coded details as reminiscent in the delayed interview if they 
were not present in the FR of the immediate interview. Repetitions were computed by 
deducting reminiscences from the total amount of details in the delayed interview and 
omissions were calculated by deducting repetitions from the total amount of details in the 
immediate FR.  
The same two coders who marked the RM details were used for the consistency 
coding. The consistency training they received followed a similar format as the training they 
received for the RM details. Again, the first coder marked all transcripts and the second coder 
marked 20.28% of the interviews. We examined inter-rater reliability for reminiscences only 
because that was the only measure coded manually. The analysis revealed moderate ICC of 
.71, CI [.36,.86] reminiscences in the delayed vs. immediate FRs.  
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Results 
Manipulation checks 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Mixed ANOVAs with Interview as the within-subject factor and Veracity as the 
between-subjects factor were used for all the manipulation checks. Table 1 shows mean 
scores, standard deviations and confidence intervals for truth tellers and liars to the pre- and 
post- questionnaires. 
The Veracity main effect was significant for Stress (liars felt more stressed than truth 
tellers, F(1, 138) = 6.47, p = .012, d = 0.43), Confidence to convince the interviewer (truth 
tellers felt more confident than liars in their ability to convince the interviewer that they were 
telling the truth, F(1, 136) = 28.13, p < .001, d = 0.90), and How many times they thought 
about the event/story before the second interview (liars thought more often about the event 
than truth tellers, F(1, 140) = 3.92, p = .02, d = 0.40)1. These results reflected the theoretical 
assumption of deception that lying is more mentally taxing task than truth telling (Vrij, 2015). 
The Veracity main effect was also significant for Extent of truthfulness (truth tellers were 
more truthful than liars during both the immediate, F(1, 139) = 89.05, p = .01, d = 6.29 and 
delayed interviews, F(1, 139) = 65.54, p = .01, d = 5.98), indicating that participants followed 
the instructions. All other Veracity main effects were not significant, all F’s < 9.14, all p’s > 
.165, see Table 1. 
Main effects for Interview emerged for Motivation, F(1, 137) = 4.39, p = .038, d = 
0.16. Participants were slightly more motivated before the immediate interview (M = 6.15, 
SD = 0.81, 95% CI [5.96,6.35]) than before the delayed interview (M = 6.01, SD = 0.93, 95% 
CI [5.82,6.19]). However, the means showed that participants were highly motivated before 
both interviews as their scores were at the upper end of the motivation scale. The Interview 
main effect was significant for: Preparation quality, F(1, 126) = 13.12, p < .001, d = 0.32; 
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Participants rated their preparation level higher before the immediate interview (M = 5.27, SD 
= 0.98, 95% CI [5.10,5.44]) than before the delayed interview (M = 4.96, SD = 0.93, 95% CI 
[4.77,5.15]); Preparation time, F(1, 132) = 21.59, p < .001, d = 0.40. Participants used more 
preparation time before the immediate interview (M = 258.34, SD = 157.85, 95% CI 
[231.28,285.39]) than before the delayed interview (M = 196.81, SD = 148.50, 95% CI 
[171.56,222.06]); and Stress, F(1, 138) = 6.48, p = .012, d = 0.19. Participants felt more 
stressed before the immediate interview (M = 3.74, SD = 1.59, 95% CI [3.48,4.00]) than 
before the delayed interview (M = 3.44, SD = 1.56, 95% CI [3.18, 3.70]). The Interview main 
effect for Confidence was not significant, F(1, 136) = 0.03, p = .869, d = 0.02. Interview 
effects on quality of preparation, time for preparation, and stress level were probably found 
because participants were less familiar with the settings before the immediate interview than 
before the delayed interview.  
Significant Veracity x Interview interaction effects emerged for Preparation time, F(1, 
132) = 4.33, p = .039, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .03. However, simple effect ANOVAs revealed no differences 
between truth tellers and liars in the immediate, F(1, 132) = 0.34, p = .576, d = 0.10,  and 
delayed interviews, F(1, 132) = 2.43, p = .122, d = 0.27.  All other Veracity x Interview 
interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 3.93, p > .050. 
A oneway ANOVA with Incentive as dependent variable revealed a significant main 
effect for Veracity. Truth-tellers were more convinced than liars that they would receive the 
full incentive of £10/2 credits, F(1, 140) = 17.49, p < .001, d = 0.70, see Table 1. A oneway 
ANOVA with Likelihood to write a statement as dependent variable revealed no significant 
main effect for Veracity, F(1, 140) = 1.92, p = .17, d = 0.23, see Table 1. (In the two latter 
analyses Interview was not included as a factor as the question referred to the two interviews 
combined.) 
In summary, the results showed that the manipulations in this study were successful.  
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Effects of Veracity, Mnemonic type and Interview time on the RM details  
To examine whether the amount of information changed between the immediate and 
delayed interviews, a mixed ANOVA was carried out with Veracity (Truth tellers vs. Liars) 
and Mnemonic (FR in the CR vs. Sketch vs. Event-line) as the between-subjects factors and 
Interview (Immediate vs. Delayed) as the within-subject factor. With visual details as 
dependent variable a significant main effect emerged of Veracity, F(1, 137) = 22.54, p < .001, 
d  = 0.79. Truth tellers (M = 103.09, SD = 35.04, 95% CI [95.38,110.74]) reported more 
visual details than liars (M = 74.40, SD = 37.34, 95% CI [66.73, 83.98]). The main effect of 
Interview was also significant, F(1, 137) = 14.12, p < .001, d  = 0.18. Interviewees reported 
more visual details immediately after watching the video (M = 60.74, SD = 26.90, 95% CI 
[56.55,64.93]) than after a two-week delay (M = 55.98, SD = 27.17, 95% CI [51.73, 60.22]).   
The Mnemonic main effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 0.46, p = .633, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .01, neither 
were the Veracity x Interview, F(1, 137) = 0.06, p = .633, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .01, Mnemonic x Interview, 
F(2, 137) = 0.30, p = .744, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .004, and Veracity x Mnemonic x Interview, F(2, 137) = 
0.71, p = .495, 𝜂𝜂p2  = .01, interaction effects.  
A mixed ANOVA with Veracity and Mnemonic as between-subjects factors and 
Interview as within-subject factor and spatial detail as the dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 49.07, p < .001, d  = 1.17. Truth tellers (M = 
56.42, SD = 23.71, 95% CI [51.23, 62.14]) reported more spatial details than liars (M = 
32.16, SD = 17.45, 95% CI [28.43, 36.27]). The main effects for Mnemonic, F(2, 137) = 1.34, 
p = .265, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .02, Interview, F(1, 137) = 0.23, p = .636, d  = 0.02, and the Veracity x 
Interview, F(1, 137) = 0.03, p = .858, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .00, Mnemonic x Interview, F(2, 137) = 0.70, p = 
.500, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .004, and Veracity x Mnemonic x Interview, F(2, 137) = 1.12, p = .329, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .02, 
interaction effects were all not significant.  
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The same mixed ANOVA with temporal details as dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 82.78, p < .001, d  = 1.56. Truth tellers 
reported more temporal details (M = 26.59, SD = 12.09, 95% CI [23.69, 29.58]) than liars (M 
= 10.99, SD = 7.42, 95% CI [9.33, 12.63]). The Mnemonic main effect was not significant, 
F(2, 137) = 0.33, p = .721, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .01. The Veracity x Interview interaction effect was 
significant, F(1, 137) = 7.76, p = .006, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .05. Truth tellers reported more temporal details 
in the immediate interview (M = 18.32, SD = 8.61, 95% CI [16.71, 19.94]) than in the 
delayed interview (M = 16.58, SD = 8.10, 95% CI [14.89, 18.27]), F(1, 141) = 8.83, p = .003, 
d  = 0.21, whereas for liars the amount of temporal information reported did not differ 
between the immediate (M = 7.19, SD = 4.86, 95% CI [5.61, 8.78]) and delayed interviews 
(M = 7.73, SD = 6.32, 95% CI [6.07, 9.39]), F(1, 141) = 0.85, p = .358, d  = 0.10. There was 
also a significant Mnemonic x Interview interaction effect, F(2, 137) = 3.79, p = .025, 𝜂𝜂p2   = 
.05. Interviewees reported more temporal details in the immediate (M = 12.77, SD = 8.22, 
95% CI [10.68, 14.63]) than in the delayed interview (M = 11.07, SD = 7.25, 95% CI [9.01, 
13.13]) in the CR condition, F(1, 140) = 4.98, p = .027, d  = 0.22, whereas the difference in 
the sketch condition between the immediate (M = 13.53, SD = 10.54, 95% CI [11.59, 15.47]) 
and delayed interview (M = 12.33, SD = 9.66, 95% CI [10.31, 14.36]), F(1, 140) = 2.50, p = 
.116, d  = 0.12, and in the event-line condition between the immediate (M = 12.08, SD = 7.80, 
95% CI [10.11, 14.06]) and delayed interview (M = 13.07, SD = 8.39, 95% CI [11.00, 
15.13]), F(1, 140) = 1.90, p = .170, d  = 0.12, were not significant. The Veracity x Mnemonic 
x Interview interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 0.09, p = .914, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .001. 
A mixed ANOVA with Veracity and Mnemonic as between-subjects factors and 
Interview as within-subject factor and action details as dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 79.09, p < .001, d  = 1.48. Truth tellers 
reported more action information (M = 37.30, SD = 14.59, 95% CI [34.33, 40.26]) than liars 
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(M = 18.63, SD = 10.16, 95% CI [15.73, 21.54]). Interview main effect was also significant, 
F(1, 137) = 10.78, p = .001, d  = 0.15. Participants reported more action details in the 
immediate (M = 28.93, SD = 16.16, 95% CI [26.29, 31.56]) than in the delayed interview (M 
= 26.55, SD = 16.23, 95% CI [23.89, 29.24]). The Mnemonic x Interview interaction effect 
was also significant, F(2, 137) = 3.21, p = .043, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .05. In the sketch condition, 
interviewees reported more action details in the immediate interview (M = 31.06, SD = 18.88, 
95% CI [28.18, 35.41]) than in the delayed interview (M = 26.41, SD = 18.95, 95% CI 
[23.21, 30.98]), (F(1, 140) = 14.33, p < .001, d  = 0.25, whereas no differences emerged 
between the interviews in the CR, F(1, 140) = 2.93, p = .089, d  = 0.15, and event-line, F(1, 
140) = 0.04, p = .852, d  = 0.02, conditions. The Veracity x Interview, F(2, 137) = 2.69, p = 
.103, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .02 and Veracity x Mnemonic x Interview interaction effects, F(2, 137) = 0.12, p = 
.885, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .002, were not significant. 
Hypotheses testing  
Amount of details in the CR mnemonic 
In Hypotheses 1 to 3 we predicted that in the delayed interview specific differences 
between truth tellers and liars would emerge as a function of mnemonic. Table 2 shows the 
results. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, truth tellers reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and 
action details than liars in the CR condition after a delay. All effect sizes were substantial 
(from 0.58 to 1.19). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Insert Table 3 about here 
In the CR condition, truth tellers reported significantly fewer temporal details in the 
delayed than in the immediate FR, F(1, 137) = 8.32, p = .005, d  = 0.38 (for means, standard 
deviations and confidence intervals, see Tables 2 and 3). For truth tellers, no significant 
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differences emerged between the immediate and delayed interview for visual, F(1, 137) = 
2.49, p = .117, d  = 0.19, spatial, F(1, 137) = 0.43, p = .515, d  = 0.09, and action details, F(1, 
137) = 3.42, p = .066, d  = 0.26. Liars in the CR condition did not show a significant 
difference in reporting visual, F(1, 137) = 1.90, p = .171, d  = 0.13, spatial, F(1, 137) = 0.09, p 
= .228, d  = 0.04, temporal, F(1, 137) = 0.09, p = .765, d  = 0.06, or action details, F(1, 137) = 
3.42, p = .066, d  = 0.09 between the immediate and delayed interviews. These results 
partially support Hypothesis 1, in which it was predicted that in the CR condition neither truth 
tellers nor liars would produce a memory decline in reporting detail after a delay. 
Amount of details in the sketch mnemonic  
Truth tellers reported significantly more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in 
the sketch condition, which was not predicted in Hypothesis 2. All effect sizes were 
substantial (from 0.73 to 1.76), see Table 2. 
In the sketch condition, truth tellers reported the same amount of visual, F(1, 137) = 
0.17, p = .680, d  = 0.04, and spatial details, F(1, 137) = 0.01, p = .909, d  = 0.01 in the 
immediate and delayed interviews. However, truth tellers reported less temporal, F(1, 137) = 
5.72, p = .018, d  = 0.27, and action details, F(1, 137) = 9.32, p = .003, d  = 0.70 in the delayed 
interview than in the immediate interview. Liars in the sketch condition reported less visual, 
F(1, 137) = 4.08, p = .045, d  = 0.23 and action details, F(1, 137) = 5.41, p = .022, d  = 0.36 in 
the delayed interview than in the immediate interview. Liars showed no difference in 
reporting spatial, F(1, 137) = 1.47, p = .228, d  = 0.19, and temporal details, F(1, 137) = 
0.002, p = .968, d  = 0.01, between the immediate and delayed interviews. This provides 
support for Hypothesis 2 in which it was predicted that in the sketch condition truth tellers, 
but not liars, would show memory decline in temporal and action details after a delay.  
Amount of details in the event-line mnemonic 
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Truth tellers reported significantly more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in 
the event-line condition, which was not predicted in Hypothesis 3. All effect sizes were 
substantial (from 0.78 to 1.40), see Table 2. 
In the event-line condition, truth tellers reported significantly less visual details, F(1, 
137) = 5.22, p = .024, d  = 0.34, in the delayed interview than in the immediate interview. 
Truth tellers showed no difference in reporting spatial, F(1, 137) = 1.72, p = .024, d  = 0.16, 
temporal, F(1, 137) = 0.01, p = .932, d  = 0.01, or action details, F(1, 137) = 1.14, p = .288, d  
= 0.13 between the immediate and delayed interviews. Liars showed no difference in 
reporting visual, F(1, 137) = 2.45, p = .120, d  = 0.26, spatial, F(1, 137) = 0.25, p = .621, d  = 
0.08, temporal, F(1, 137) = 3.54, p = .062, d  = 0.28, or action details, F(1, 137) = 0.61, p = 
.435, d  = 0.17 between the immediate and delayed interview. These results partially support 
Hypothesis 3, in which it was predicted that in the event-line condition, truth tellers, but not 
liars, would show a memory decline in visual and spatial details after a delay. 
We made a closer observation of the patterns of total details reported by truth tellers 
and liars across conditions in the immediate and delayed FR phases. Our results revealed that 
liars showed flat tendency to report details irrespective of condition and time of the interview. 
However, there was more variability across truth tellers, see Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Consistency between the immediate and delayed interviews  
A 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Mnemonic) analysis of covariance was conducted with 
reminiscences as the dependent variable and Total detail at immediate FR as a covariate. The 
reason for including this covariate was that the number of reminiscences in the delayed 
interview depends on the amount of detail provided in the FR part of the immediate interview. 
That is, the more detail provided in the immediate FR, the less opportunity to add new detail 
in the delayed interview. Veracity, F(1, 131) = 0.61, p = .437, d  = .14, and Mnemonic, F(2, 
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131) = 1.50, p = .228, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .02 main effects, or Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect, F(2, 
131) = 0.95, p = .388, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .01 were not significant. This showed no support for Hypothesis 
4. 
A 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Mnemonic) analysis of covariance with repetitions in the delayed 
interview as dependent variable and Total detail in the immediate FR as covariate did not 
result in significant main effects for Veracity, F(1, 131) = 0.71, p = .680, d = .07, and or 
Mnemonic, F(2, 131) = 0.19, p = .831, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .003. Although the Veracity x Mnemonic 
interaction effect was significant, F(2, 131) = 4.28, p = .016, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .06, simple effect analyses 
showed no significant differences. That is, in the CR condition, truth tellers provided a similar 
amount of  repetitions (M = 100.21, SD = 43.24, 95% CI [85.60,117.29]) to liars (M = 
105.84, SD = 52.87, 95% CI [87.73,122.38]), F(1, 43) = 0.68, p = .415, d = 0.12; in the sketch 
condition, truth tellers provided a similar amount of repetitions (M = 106.27, SD = 62.36, 
95% CI [87.57,128.42]) to liars (M = 91.64, SD = 32.27, 95% CI [76.52,120.50]), F(1, 45) = 
4.05, p = .05, d = 0.29; and in the event-line condition, truth tellers reported a similar amount 
of repetitions (M = 111.26, SD = 43.74, 95% CI [96.61,125.14]) to liars (M = 117.29, SD = 
41.20, 95% CI [86.71,119.29]), F(1, 43) = 1.11, p = .297, d = 0.14.  
As the number of omissions was derived from the number of total details minus 
number of repetitions, a 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Mnemonic) analysis of covariance with omissions 
as the dependent variable and Total detail at immediate FR as covariate resulted in identical 
effect sizes (not significant) as in the analysis of repetitions. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported.  
RM details in mnemonics 
A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of visual details in the 
mnemonic part of the immediate interview as dependent variable revealed a significant main 
 Mnemonics and memory-based lie detection 28 
effect for Mnemonic, F(2, 137) = 6.88, p = .001, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .09. Tukey post-hoc tests showed that 
interviewees reported significantly more visual details in the sketch condition (M = 52.63, SD 
= 28.46, 95% CI [45.86,60.41]) than in the CR condition (M = 32.68, SD = 27.45, 95% CI 
[25.43,41.90]). Participants in the event-line condition (M = 46.43, SD = 26.03, 95% CI 
[39.90,53.79]) also reported significantly more visual details than participants in the CR 
condition. There was no significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 2.25, p = .136, d  = 
0.22, or a significant Veracity x Mnemonic interaction, F(2, 137) = 1.96, p = .145, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .03. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of spatial details in the 
mnemonic part of the immediate interview as dependent variable revealed a main effect for 
Veracity, F(1, 137) = 9.59, p = .002, d  = 0.45. Truth tellers gave more spatial information (M 
= 26.87, SD = 20.33, 95% CI [22.25, 31.80]) than liars (M = 19.00, SD = 14.04, 95% CI 
[15.97, 22.11]). The Mnemonic main effect was also significant F(2, 137) = 12.10, p < .001, 
𝜂𝜂p
2   = .15. Post-hoc tests revealed that interviewees provided more spatial details in the sketch 
(M = 28.67, SD = 16.07, 95% CI [24.39, 32.94]) and event-line conditions (M = 25.87, SD = 
19.51, 95% CI [20.58, 31.91]) than in the CR condition (M = 13.77, SD = 14.02, 95% CI 
[10.38, 17.50]). The Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 
3.04, p = .051, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .04. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of temporal details in the 
mnemonic part of the immediate interview as dependent variable revealed a significant main 
effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 10.35, p = .002, d  = 0.45. Truth tellers reported more 
temporal details (M = 10.96, SD = 11.07, 95% CI [8.16, 13.84]) than liars (M = 6.75, SD = 
7.43, 95% CI [6.01,8.84]). In addition, the Mnemonic main effect was significant F(2, 137) = 
31.85, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .32. Post-hoc tests showed that more temporal details were reported in 
the event-line condition (M = 16.21, SD = 9.80, 95% CI [13.29, 19.22]) than in the CR (M = 
5.53, SD = 6.81, 95% CI [3.87,7.38]) and sketch conditions (M = 4.86, SD = 7.44, 95% CI 
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[2.98,6.89]). The Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 
2.76, p = .067, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .04.  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of action details as 
dependent variable revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 9.66, p = .002, 
d  = 0.46. Truth tellers mentioned more action details (M = 21.63, SD = 21.45, 95% CI 
[17.21,26.59]) than liars (M = 13.40, SD = 13.60, 95% CI [10.33,16.77]). The Mnemonic 
main effect was also significant, F(2, 137) = 20.12, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .23. Post-hoc tests revealed 
that in the event-line (M = 29.28, SD = 17.97, 95% CI [24.31,34.50]) condition, interviewees 
reported more information about actions than in the CR (M = 12.77, SD = 17.01, 95% CI 
[8.46,17.68]) and sketch conditions (M = 10.53, SD = 13.98, 95% CI [7.04,14.55]). The 
Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 2.21, p = .113, 𝜂𝜂p2   = 
.03.  
None of the interaction effects were significant. However, these interaction effects do 
not necessarily reflect the specific type of interaction we were interested in: Comparing the 
details between truth tellers and liars for the three mnemonic parts of the interview separately. 
In alignment with Nahari and Ben-Shakhar (2011) and previous deception literature (e.g. 
Deeb et al., 2017; Shaw et al., 2015) we believe that this justifies further examination of the 
data, specifically, examining the simple Veracity effects for the three mnemonic parts of the 
interview separately. The results are provided in Table 4.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
We found no significant differences between truth tellers and liars in reporting visual, 
spatial, temporal, and action details in the CR condition. In the Sketch condition, truth tellers 
reported more spatial and temporal details than liars. Other mean differences were not 
significant in this mnemonic group. In the event-line condition, truth tellers provided more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars.  
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Discussion 
This study examined how different mnemonic techniques employed in an immediate 
interview affected delayed statements. In the CR condition, truth tellers provided more visual, 
spatial, temporal and action details than liars after a delay. This finding was in line with 
Hypothesis 1. In addition, as predicted, liars did not show a decline in reporting details over 
time. Truth tellers, however, showed a decline in reporting temporal details over time, which 
was not expected, as it was thought that the CR mnemonic would ‘buffer’ the truth tellers  
against forgetting. 
In line with Hypothesis 2, in the sketch condition truth tellers reported more visual and 
spatial details than liars in the delayed accounts. In addition, truth tellers, but not liars, showed 
a decline in reporting temporal and action details over time. There were two findings we did 
not predict. First, truth tellers also reported more temporal and action details than liars after a 
delay, suggesting that when the sketch technique was used, truth tellers provided richer 
reports in terms of all types of detail. Second, liars also showed a decline in reporting visual 
and action details. According to the ‘repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis’ (Granhag & Strömwall, 
1999), liars show a tendency to repeat their stories when interviewed repeatedly. The findings 
suggest that liars experienced difficulties in mimicking natural memory retrieval that should 
be produced by truth tellers. A sketch facilitates retrieval of visual and spatial details. Liars 
did not consider that if the sketch facilitates retrieval of such details, their memories for these 
details should be less affected than for action and temporal details after a delay (the pattern 
shown by truth tellers in this study).   
In the event-line condition, truth tellers again reported more visual, spatial, temporal, 
and action details than liars after a delay. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, truth tellers showed a 
decline in providing visual details, but the predicted decline in reporting spatial details did not 
occur. In support of Hypothesis 3, liars reported a similar amount of visual, spatial, temporal 
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and action details both immediately and after a delay. Again, truth tellers showed to some 
extent a natural decline of the details that were less prominent with the event-line technique 
(visual details), but liars did not consider that after a delay some details should be better 
remembered than others.  
When considering the reporting patterns of truth tellers and liars across conditions, our 
study showed as a general tendency that truth tellers showed more of a decline in the amount 
of details reported compared to liars. The truth tellers’ findings are in line with memory 
theory that highlights a reduction in recall of information over time because of weakened 
memory traces (Goldsmith et al., 2005; Penrod et al., 1982; Schacter, 1999). The liars’ results 
provide evidence for a stability bias: Liars’ failure to calibrate accurately their verbal output 
to take into account genuine decline in memory (Harvey et al., 2017). 
With regard to consistency between the immediate and delayed statements, we found 
no differences in consistency between truth tellers and liars, and Hypothesis 4 was therefore 
rejected. In alignment with previous research (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Vredeveldt et al., 
Granhag et al., 2016) but in contrast to the widely held stereotypical view (Bogaard et al., 
2016), our study showed that truth tellers and liars can be equally consistent in their 
statements. 
Although our study concentrated on comparisons between immediate and delayed 
accounts, we also reported comparisons between the initial and mnemonic parts of the 
immediate interview. In brief, we found that participants in the CR mnemonic performed the 
worst in eliciting additional detail, and the event-line mnemonic the best. Also in terms of the 
ability to discriminate between truth tellers and liars, the CR mnemonic was the least, and the 
event-line was the most effective mnemonic. Perhaps the event-line mnemonic was the most 
effective in eliciting information and in distinguishing between truth tellers and liars because 
the stimulus event (break-in) was dynamic. The entire 5 minute video was full of different 
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activities, and in such a situation the event-line technique might be very helpful for truth 
tellers in facilitating recall of actions and events, and their temporal order. Liars typically 
experience an information management dilemma (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). They are 
typically motivated to report some information, but not too much. This dilemma might exist 
even when mnemonics are used in interviews.  
The differences between truth tellers and liars were substantial (i.e. effect sizes were 
high) across all conditions. Our findings thus revealed that the ‘richness of detail’ verbal cue 
remains a diagnostic cue to deceit, even after longer delay periods. This is a novel finding 
compared with previous studies that showed that truth tellers’ and liars’ accounts became 
similar over time (Harvey et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2009). The important difference between 
those studies and the current study is that in those studies participants were interviewed only 
once, either immediately or after the delay, whereas in the current study they were 
interviewed twice. Perhaps the immediate interview in truth tellers served as a buffer for 
forgetting in the delayed interview. The use of mnemonics in the immediate interview may 
have further strengthened this buffer effect. 
The findings have important practical implications. First of all, they suggest that using 
mnemonic techniques during the first interview is helpful in terms of information gathering 
during subsequent interviews with the interviewee. Furthermore, using mnemonic techniques 
during the first interview can aid discriminating between truth tellers and liars in subsequent 
interviews.  
Methodological considerations and future research 
The main methodological consideration in our study might be that it did not contain a 
‘no mnemonics’ control group, which makes it impossible to determine whether the mere 
presence of a mnemonic has influenced the delayed reports of truth tellers and liars. However, 
our main concern was to examine how different mnemonics would affect the reports of truth 
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tellers and liars over time. Further deception studies might profit from examining separate 
mnemonics (e.g. event-line) and compare them to the performance of a no mnemonics control 
group.  
Research has shown that an immediate retrieval act tend to strengthen episodic 
memory and facilitate later retrieval (Bjork, 1988; Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 1995; Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006). Therefore, truth tellers in our study could maintain rich accounts after a 
delay due to immediate retrieval practice, but not as a result of specific mnemonic techniques 
per se. In further studies it would be valuable to examine truth tellers’ and liars’ performances 
when a first statement is not given immediately, but after some delay, and how mnemonic 
techniques then affect first and subsequent statements. In real-life cases this situation occurs 
frequently. Further studies could use scenarios with active involvement of participants, rather 
than passively watching a video as we did in this study. Using a video has a benefit of 
exerting complete experimental control with all participants witnessing exactly the same 
event. However, this benefit comes at the expense of ecological validity.  
Conclusion 
This study showed that when mnemonics were used during the immediate interview, the 
verbal cue ‘richness of detail’ remained a diagnostic cue to deceit even after a delay. In 
addition, truth tellers more often than liars showed a decline in reporting details after a delay. 
Truth tellers showed patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay, whereas liars 
showed patterns of ‘stability bias’, a failure to accurately estimate memory decay (Harvey et 
al., 2017). Overall, the findings indicate that using mnemonic techniques such as the CR, 
using a sketch, or event-line in a first interview are promising tools to deception detection in 
subsequent interviews.  
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for the answers to pre-interview and 
post-interview questionnaires 
 Truth Lie 
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI 
Motivation to convince the 
interviewer 
6.15 0.81 5.94,6.35 6.00 0.78 5.82,6.20 
Preparation quality 5.19 1.00 4.94,5.43 5.05 0.79 4.86,5.25 
Preparation time (sec.) 233.68 129.20 203.34,265.37 221.49 135.59 190.26,254.52 
Stress before the interview 3.29 1.47 2.94,3.69 3.89 1.30 3.58,4.19 
Confidence to convince the 
interviewer 
5.42 1.02 5.17,5.67 4.48 1.06 4.22,4.74 
Likelihood to receive  £10/2 
credits 
5.21 1.23 4.92,5.50 4.32 1.32 4.01,4.60 
Likelihood to write a 
statement 
3.51 1.69 3.12,3.90 3.86 1.24 3.55,4.15 
Times thought about the 
event/story 
2.23 1.27 1.96,2.51 2.85 1.75 2.44,3.27 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
immediate interview 
99.41 2.37 98.78,100.00 20.82 17.14 16.96,25.46 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
delayed interview 
98.53 4.32 97.41,99.55 20.82 17.93 16.53,25.37 
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Table 2 
RM details in delayed FR as a function of veracity and mnemonic condition 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
CR  
Visual 62.58 25.21 52.23,72.94 47.09 28.26 36.51,57.66 4.29 .040 0.58 
Spatial 31.83 13.82 25.73,37.93 21.22 14.89 14.99,27.45 5.80 .017 0.74 
Temporal 14.83 7.19 11.95,17.72 7.30 5.06 4.36,10.25 13.03 <.001 1.21 
Action 32.83 12.93 27.29,38.38 17.70 12.41 12.03,23.36 14.27 <.001 1.19 
Sketch 
Visual 70.26 35.05 59.69,80.36 48.27 24.53 38.32,58.22 8.97 .003 0.73 
Spatial 41.35 21.63 35.12,47.58 22.50 10.43 16.64,28.36 18.99 <.001 1.11 
Temporal 18.78 8.87 15.84,21.73 5.89 5.36 3.11,8.66 39.72 <.001 1.76 
Action 38.30 19.35 32.64,43.97 15.89 10.72 10.56,21.21 32.53 <.001 1.43 
Event-line 
Visual 64.52 20.28 53.95,75.10 43.13 17.20 32.77,53.48 8.18 .005 1.14 
Spatial 40.87 15.92 34.64,47.10 21.08 12.20 14.98,27.18 20.14 <.001 1.40 
Temporal 16.13 8.04 13.18,19.08 10.00 7.73 7.11,12.89 8.64 .004 0.78  
Action 35.44 14.08 23.77,41.10 20.54 11.67 15.00,26.09 13.81 <.001 1.15 
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Table 3 
RM details in the immediate FR as a function of veracity and mnemonic condition 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
CR           
Visual 67.46 28.84 57.25,77.67 51.44 32.81 41.00,61.86 4.71 .032 0.52 
Spatial 33.04 14.04 27.36,38.73 21.78 13.07 15.98,27.59 7.51 .007 0.83 
Temporal 17.71 7.81 14,95,20,47 7.61 4.80 4.79,10.43 25.56 <.001 1.56 
Action 36.08 12.21 30.93,41.23 18.70 9.38 13.43,23.96 21.81 <.001 1.60 
Sketch          
Visual 71.57 23.57 61.14,82,00 54.27 27.46 44.46,64.08 5.71 .018 0.68 
Spatial 41.13 18.49 35.36,46.94 20.35 11.75 14.89,25.81 26.59 <.001 1.34 
Temporal 21.22 9.29 18.40,24.04 5.85 4.68 3.19,8.50 61.52 <.001 2.09 
Action 43.78 17.93 38.52,49.04 19.81 10.98 14.86,24.76 43.08 <.001 1.61 
Event-line          
Visual 71.74 22.00 61.31,82.17 47.96 19.96 37.75,58.17 10.38 .002 1.13 
Spatial 38.39 14.54 32.59,44.20 22.00 11.87 16.32,27.68 15.92 <.001 1.23 
Temporal 16.04 8.87 13.22,18.87 8.13 5.36 5.36,10.89 15.71 <.001 1.08 
Action 37.35 14.75 32.09,42.61 19.17 9.48 14.02,24.32 23.84 <.001 1.47 
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Figure 1. Total amount of details with confidence intervals in the immediate and delayed FRs 
across conditions. 
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Table 4 
RM details in the different mnemonic conditions in the immediate interview 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
CR           
Visual 31.29 28.43 22.13,41.86 34.13 26.94 24.88,46.23 0.13 .720 0.10 
Spatial 13.58 15.68 8.55,20.19 13.96 12.40 9.46,18.90 0.01 .936 0.03 
Temporal 5.54 7.62 3.59,10.39 5.52 6.02 3.41,8.20 0.00 .993 0.002 
Action 13.92 20.41 6.72,22.47 11.57 12.90 7.23,17.61 0.26 .610 0.14 
Sketch          
Visual 54.96 24.46 44.90,65.87 50.58 31.93 40.66,62.55 0.32 .573 0.15 
Spatial 30.70 15.47 27.35,40.33 24.27 15.54 19.99,29.62 4.29 .04 0.61 
Temporal 7.61 8.88 4.05,11.31 2.42 4.88 1.04,4.13 5.45 .021 0.72 
Action 14.00 14.26 8.35,19.82 7.46 13.24 3.48,12.82 2.10 .15 0.48 
Event-line          
Visual 56.24 28.25 46.63,67.20 37.21 20.27 30.11,45.89 5.40 .018 0.77 
Spatial 33.91 22.51 26.00,42.87 18.17 12.25 13.77,23.46 11.42 .001 0.87 
Temporal 19.96 12.62 9.83,15.88 12.63 7.31 9.83,15.88 5.45 .021 0.68 
Action 37.30 20.53 29.43,45.64 21.58 10.78 17.78,25.76 11.68 .001 0.96 
 
 
 
1 When this variable was introduced as a covariate in the analyses, there was no 
significant effect in the delayed statement on Total detail, F(1, 138) = 1.09, p = .298, 𝜂𝜂p2= .01, 
Reminiscences, F(1, 138) = 0.17, p = .684, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .001, Repetitions, F(1, 140) = 2.90, p = .091, 
𝜂𝜂p
2 = .02, or Omissions, F(1, 138) = 0.40, p = .526, 𝜂𝜂p2   = .003.   
 
                                                          
